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The Politics of Katrina in New Orleans: A
View from Ground Zero
Christine L. Day and Marc R. Rosenblum
Abstract
What is New Orleans like today? What will it take to return the city to some semblance of
normalcy? Stunned by the events and revelations of governmental incompetence since Katrina, we
review Katrina's aftermath and chime in on current policy debates about the city’s future. Our love
for New Orleans may compromise our objectivity, but we find scholarly inspiration in three
excellent articles in the last issue of The Forum.
Author Notes: Christine L. Day is a professor of political science at the University of New
Orleans. Her major research areas include interest group politics, gender and politics, and political
gerontology. As a one-time evacuee, she knows what it means to miss New Orleans. Marc R.
Rosenblum is an assistant professor of political science at the University of New Orleans
specializing in immigration, US-Latin American relations, and Latin American politics. He had
the good fortune to leave New Orleans August 1, 2005 to begin a one-year fellowship as a Council
on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. He is currently a Visiting Scholar at the
Migration Policy Institute, and will begin working for the Senate Immigration Subcommittee
beginning in February.
 “Louisiana is dysfunctional,” Michael Brown testified before Congress 
shortly after he stepped down as director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to spend more time with his family. 
Indeed, here in New Orleans, piles of debris littered the streets; houses and 
storefronts stood boarded up and vacant; thieves and marauders terrorized 
residents; and City Hall remained paralyzed by bureaucratic ineptitude and 
corruption. 
And that was before Katrina. 
Brown’s only failure other than calling too few press conferences, he testified 
further, was his inability to unite Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New 
Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin around a post-Katrina plan of action. Leadership 
failures can certainly be cited in both cases, and there was a long line of public 
officials at every level of government who displayed less than stellar 
performance, and poor coordination, in post-Katrina emergency management. 
Many of these shortcomings were outlined in broader theoretical perspective by 
Louise Comfort, Patrick Roberts, and Amanda Hollis, in three excellent articles in 
the last Forum.1 
But the most egregious dysfunctions occurred at the federal level, with FEMA 
Director Brown leading the parade. When FEMA’s lone official in New Orleans 
e-mailed urgent messages to Brown about the desperate need for food, water, and 
medical care in the city’s shelters—without which “many will die within 
hours”—his press secretary replied that Brown needed more time to eat dinner at 
a Baton Rouge restaurant. Brown later denied any knowledge of the grave 
conditions in the city during the days following Katrina, even as the rest of the 
nation watched the horror unfold on television. Emergency management, all three 
Forum authors agree, should require training, experience, expertise, and 
professional leadership. New Orleans and the Gulf Coast would have benefited 
from such leadership. 
But FEMA’s problems, as the authors note, stretch far beyond the lack of 
professionalism at the top; they can be traced to changes at the agency following 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Dropping FEMA into the massive new Department of 
Homeland Security, emphasizing terrorism over natural disasters, filling senior 
positions in the agency with political appointees lacking in emergency 
management experience, and alienating many of the experienced employees who 
were already there all contributed to the agency’s poor preparation for and 
response to Katrina’s devastation. Had Katrina struck in the 1990s, when FEMA 
drew high praise for its effective emergency management, New Orleans might 
have been spared much grief. None of this bodes well for federal response to any 
future disaster—natural, terrorist, or other. 
                                                 
1 The Forum, Volume 3, Issue 3, 2005, articles 1-3. 
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 “You’re doing a heck of a job, Brownie,” President Bush told his appointed 
FEMA director in the days following Katrina. What about the president himself? 
The White House did stay busy during Katrina’s aftermath—with its relentless 
effort to turn Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco into scapegoats for the tragedy. 
Mayor Nagin’s primary response to the impending storm was to order, for the 
first time in the 287-year history of New Orleans, a mandatory evacuation of the 
entire city. Amazingly, 90 percent of the city’s residents fled, including a huge 
proportion of those with resources who have repeatedly asserted in the past that 
they “never evacuate.” Nagin failed to mobilize buses and other resources to get 
some of the city’s poorest out to safety; but locals also know that New Orleans’ 
complex race and class relations insured that many of these people would not 
have left other than at the point of a gun. Neither time nor political will would 
have supported a truly mandatory evacuation. In the aftermath of the storm, Nagin 
sounded a consistent theme: please send massive federal assistance now; we need 
your help. 
What about the governor? Blanco declared a state of emergency on August 
26, three days before the storm struck, and she called up those members of 
Louisiana’s National Guard not already deployed to Iraq. Although the Guard’s 
response was hampered by the fact that half of its membership and virtually all of 
its heavy equipment remained in Iraq—after the army refused Louisiana’s request 
to release the latter—Blanco’s December release of more than 100,000 documents 
related to Katrina and its aftermath confirm that the governor did what we would 
expect: requesting federal assistance early and unambiguously. 
The president responded, in fact, by declaring a state of emergency on the 
Saturday before the storm struck—accepting responsibility from that moment 
forward for minimizing Katrina’s damage. And then what? Not much. Bush 
remained on vacation for several more days, making side trips to California and 
Arizona to drum up support for the Iraq War and Medicaid reform; and he did not 
visit the disaster region until Friday, five full days after Katrina made landfall. 
Attempting to rehabilitate his image, the president gave a rousing speech on 
September 15 in Jackson Square in the heart of New Orleans, promising to “do 
what it takes … stay as long as it takes” to restore the city. Yet the president has 
since backed off from supporting his own recovery package, creating what The 
New York Times called “a vast gulf between words and action.” 
Federal responsibility for the post-Katrina flood that ravaged New Orleans is 
not limited to the Bush Administration. “Implicit in U.S. law and policy is the 
premise that the quintessential responsibility of government is to protect the lives 
and property of its citizens and to maintain continuity of operations for its 
communities,” Louise Comfort notes in her Forum article (p. 1). When it comes 
to hurricane preparation and flood control, Congress had explicitly charged the 
Army Corps of Engineers with responsibility for “works of improvement relating 
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 to flood control” (US Code, Title 33, 701) including the system of levees and 
pumps designed to keep southeastern Louisiana safe and dry from the known 
threat of storms like Hurricane Katrina. The Corps warned repeatedly since the 
mid-90s that the levee system was in need of additional resources, and local 
officials have pleaded with the federal government to upgrade New Orleans’ 
levee system from its pre-Katrina capacity to handle a “Category 3” storm, to put 
in place Category 5 protection—the strongest there is. Yet in the four years prior 
to Katrina the Bush Administration and Congress accelerated budget cuts initiated 
in the Clinton years: cutting funding for Lake Ponchartrain levees in half and for 
the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project by two-thirds. This latest 
negligence was probably not decisive, however. Subsequent investigations by 
engineering teams, including one sponsored by the National Science Foundation, 
have found evidence of poor construction, design flaws, and possibly even fraud 
and criminal malfeasance on the part of the Army Corps and its subcontractors. 
Officials at local, state, and national levels are weighing litigation, and many 
homeowners are considering private and class action lawsuits against the Corps of 
Engineers as well as the Orleans Levee Board, charged with maintaining the 
levees. 
Much of the country is shocked by these failures at all levels of government in 
the years before Katrina and in the days surrounding its landfall. Inevitably, new 
disasters occurred—including two more major hurricanes and the devastating 
Central Asian earthquake—and the US news cycle has moved on to cover 
Washington’s latest political scandals, the president’s declining poll numbers, and 
(at last) something resembling a debate over the Iraq war. Yet many victims of 
Hurricane Katrina continue to feel let down by our elected representatives, and in 
many cases that government officials are exacerbating our problems. Even well-
educated middle-class victims of the storm find it difficult to navigate FEMA’s 
bureaucracy in order to request economic assistance, and requests for assistance 
with FEMA paperwork or for information about the status of our claims fall on 
deaf ears. Thousands of us have lost our jobs and as landlords and mortgage 
companies reached the end of their forbearance periods no government assistance 
or regulation has prevented summary evictions or the first round of house 
foreclosures. Many of us want to rebuild or renovate our houses, but we are 
prevented from doing so because neither FEMA nor the city of New Orleans will 
tell us what changes we will have to make to obtain flood insurance in the 
future—or whether houses on our land will be insurable under any conditions. 
And most importantly, New Orleans’ homeowners and businesses feel unable to 
make any concrete plans for the future until plans are announced regarding the 
future of the city’s levee system. Each day of congressional inaction forces some 
of us to make plans elsewhere, and threatens to guarantee that even heroic efforts 
in the future will prove to be too little, too late.  
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 Comprehensive and effective emergency management, the three Forum 
authors suggest, must include prevention, preparation and mitigation as well as 
response and recovery. Full recovery for the city of New Orleans must include 
hurricane-protection planning; without it, repopulation and rebuilding will be 
slow and investors reluctant. Thus we focus now on the post-disaster recovery 
efforts, which will preoccupy our city for years to come.2 
More than four months after Katrina came ashore, most of the city resembles a 
vast wasteland and 80 percent of its inhabitants remain displaced. Homes and 
businesses stand damaged and empty for miles and miles, many with their 
contents still out on the curb in huge piles of ruined furniture and appliances and 
sodden Sheetrock. Mountains of garbage, dead refrigerators, and thousands of 
dusty, rusted vehicles and battered boats line the streets and median strips. The 
garbage in the streets, only a fraction of which has been collected, represents 34 
normal years’ worth, and may take years to be cleared away. And many houses 
have yet to be gutted or bulldozed. At night the streets are pitch black. 
Along the rim of the bowl-shaped city, especially along the Mississippi River 
from Uptown past the French Quarter, about 20 percent of the city stayed dry 
after the levees broke. There, the lights are on, many restaurants, clubs, and other 
businesses have reopened, and the streets bustle with life. To go from there to the 
rest of the city is like switching from color to black-and-white; it’s like 
penetrating a war zone; it’s like entering a Mad Max movie. With few schools 
open, there are almost no children. In a city where children normally fill the 
streets and playgrounds, laughing and running, shooting hoops, catching Mardi 
Gras beads, the dearth of children may be the weirdest thing of all. 
What can be done to restore New Orleans? With 300,000 residents and 
160,000 jobs gone, and 110,000 homes damaged, in a city of half a million pre-
Katrina residents, this will be the biggest urban rebuilding effort in U.S. history. 
Decisions we make now about the size and direction of disaster relief will 
determine whether our city retains its population base, its economic viability, and 
its unique cultural heritage. 
Helping People Return and Rebuild. The trick here is to strike a balance 
between rebuilding quickly and rebuilding wisely. People are eager to return to 
their homes, salvage what they can, and replace what they cannot. They must be 
allowed to do so while the momentum is still high. At the same time, unregulated 
                                                 
2 We focus on New Orleans because of its unique situation following Katrina—most of the 
damage there and in neighboring parishes was due not directly to the hurricane, but to water and 
mold damage after the levees breached and flooded the city—and because New Orleans is our 
home. Our intention is not to ignore the plight of all the other communities along the Gulf Coast in 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama that were ravaged by Hurricane Katrina, as well as all the 
communities in Louisiana and Texas that were pounded just four weeks later by Hurricane Rita. 
Many of our comments and suggestions for rebuilding apply to those areas as well. 
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 and scattershot redevelopment, especially in the lowest-lying areas, could leave 
homeowners stuck in unsafe houses on largely abandoned streets devoid of 
property value. Many property owners are caught in a trick bag: They don’t want 
to abandon their properties, but they are reluctant to jump into home rehabilitation 
without clear and accurate information on building codes, flood plain elevations, 
utility restoration, garbage collection, mold abatement, city inspectors’ home 
assessments, and insurability. Local and federal agencies need to establish rules 
and guidelines and to provide a central clearinghouse of such information, for 
example on the city’s web site. Meanwhile, there is an acute need for temporary 
housing, and FEMA has been slow to respond with trailers or other interim 
solutions. 
 Many homeowners have federally-underwritten flood insurance, but because 
flood policies are not typically written with a total loss in mind, benefits are only 
high enough to pay off existing mortgages, not to put down-payments on new 
homes. Thus, in a city with one of the country’s lowest home-ownership rates, 
tens of thousands of citizens are threatened with an unexpected exit from the 
“ownership society.” Congress should prevent this outcome by mandating that 
flood victims be allowed to draw on homeowners’ coverage or by requiring that 
banks write off portions of the existing loans. Unchecked private land speculation 
in devastated neighborhoods could shut out many lower- and middle-income 
displaced residents. Alternatively, better planning could turn the city’s long-time 
renters into first-time owners. 
The city and state should present a unified vision to Congress. Both Governor 
Blanco and Mayor Nagin have appointed commissions to develop a 
comprehensive plan. The governor and the mayor are not exactly the closest of 
friends, and intergovernmental coordination could be tighter. Further, although 
both chief executives exhort their advisors to “think outside the box,” their 
commissions are heavily weighted toward wealthy business interests that have 
flourished under the status quo. (No surprise there.) Happily, though, interaction 
between the two commissions has improved in recent weeks, and both have 
received excellent advice from professional planning organizations: Encourage 
high-density mixed-income neighborhoods by combining market-rate and 
subsidized housing in the higher, safer areas of town. Turn some of the low-lying 
unsafe areas into green space that could withstand occasional flooding, 
compensating property owners in those areas at pre-Katrina market rates. 
Backward-looking respect for New Orleans’ unique architectural heritage should 
be combined with forward-looking city planning to create mixed-income 
neighborhoods anchored around naturally integrated schools, places of worship, 
and community centers. 
Economic Development. Rebuilding and modernizing the Port of New 
Orleans, situated as it is near the mouth of the Mississippi River, serves the 
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 national economy and therefore deserves federal financial support. Likewise, tax 
credits and bridge loans to help small businesses recover will benefit the national 
as well as the local economies. The oil, gas, and chemical industries are already 
deeply invested in the area’s economy, but their extravagant profits could be 
better distributed toward further development of the area’s ecology and workers’ 
well-being. 
Reconstruction itself can be a boon to the local economy, especially if New 
Orleans is rebuilt by local businesses and by local workers who are paid decent 
wages. Hundreds of millions of dollars in federal rebuilding contracts were 
quickly awarded to well-connected multinational corporations such as AshBritt 
Environmental, a client of Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour’s high-powered 
Washington lobbying firm and major contributor to Republican federal 
candidates, and Halliburton, which needs no introduction. Only after public 
criticism did FEMA announce plans to reopen many of those contracts to 
competitive bidding; but the rebidding has yet to take place and to date only seven 
percent of federal rebuilding dollars has gone to companies in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, or Alabama. The largest local company to receive Katrina contracts 
is Baton Rouge-based Shaw Group Inc., whose CEO chaired the Louisiana 
Democratic Party until a few weeks ago, pals around with Governor Blanco, and 
contributes handsomely to federal candidates of both parties including President 
Bush. Meanwhile, one of Bush’s first actions after Katrina was to suspend Davis-
Bacon provisions requiring that federal contracts pay workers the prevailing 
wages in their communities. Again, only after public criticism and under 
congressional pressure did Bush reinstate the Davis-Bacon wage rules in late 
October. 
New Orleans arguably leads the world in musical talent per capita, and boasts 
an astoundingly rich history of musical innovation and incubation. There is no 
reason why other aspects of the music business, including recording, production, 
and distribution, could not be developed locally into a world-class industry. 
Further, with two major schools of medicine and public health, those affiliated 
with Louisiana State and Tulane Universities, the health care and biosciences 
sector could be developed into another strong economic force in the city. In a 
state with one of the highest proportions of uninsured residents, more 
comprehensive coverage and more emphasis on preventive health care would also 
be cost-effective for the state and city. 
Tourism has long been a major feature of the local economy due to New 
Orleans’ unique indigenous culture and its incomparable ability to show people a 
good time. Redevelopment must carefully preserve the authenticity of its cultural 
mélange—Creole, Cajun, Caribbean, Mediterranean, indigenous, exotic, 
everything but the banal—and the idiosyncratic spontaneity of its everyday life. 
Planning is good, but too much planning runs the danger of turning this tourist 
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 mecca into a Disneyesque Gumboland or Jazz World—or even into a semitropical 
casino district, a proposal forwarded by Mayor Nagin in a moment of madness 
weeks after the storm and then hastily retracted under a storm of criticism. 
Hurricane and Flood Protection. Neither repopulation nor economic 
development is likely to progress very far unless residents and investors feel safe 
from future catastrophes. Category 3 hurricane protection will require not only 
reconstructing the levee system but also correcting the errors and omissions that 
led the levees to buckle under Katrina’s Category-3 force. Category 5 protection 
would require a more extensive network of levees and floodgates, as well as 
perhaps water reservoirs and green space within the city that could alleviate the 
flooding. The Corps’ plan for Category 5 protection also includes steps to shore 
up the eroding coastline, an important part of protecting the city and the entire 
region. Much of the wetlands and many of the barrier islands along the Gulf have 
disappeared in recent decades, and with them, we have lost a good deal of natural 
protection against the force of hurricanes as they slam into the coast. 
Much of the public debate about Katrina recovery has rightly focused on 
whether improvements to New Orleans’ and southeastern Louisiana’s levee 
systems are worth the cost, which the Corps of Engineers has estimated to be $3.5 
billion and $32 billion, respectively, spread out over ten years. Can the nation 
afford to spend $32 billion in one small region at this time of record deficits? 
These numbers are hard for most people to get a handle on: $32 billion is slightly 
more than twice the budget for the US Department of Education ($14 billion); it is 
one third the annual budget for US loans and aid to other countries; it is the 
amount the United States will spend in the next four months on the war in Iraq; it 
is 1.2 percent of the 2005 US federal budget, and (without other offsets and 
without accounting for the fiscal benefits associated with new construction) 
assuming the cost of the entire levee expansion would increase the US federal 
debt by 0.4 percent. $32 billion is also far less than the estimated $250 billion in 
losses caused by Katrina. 
Thus, while $32 billion would be a large expense, it is not out of scale with 
projects the federal government undertakes, and the decision about whether or not 
to fund major levee upgrades will turn on political will, not fiscal capacity. For 
this reason, we should consider a broader set of pros and cons. On one hand, as 
Patrick Roberts points out in his Forum article, increasing investment in hurricane 
and flood protection runs the danger of risk homeostasis: increasingly risky 
production and behavior that outruns the safety technology. Many 
environmentalists are rightly concerned about any steps to encourage individuals 
to return to below-sea level housing even as ever rising temperatures and sea 
levels make these areas increasingly vulnerable. At a minimum, levee upgrades 
must therefore be accompanied by public education and careful evacuation 
planning; and individual responsibility must be supplemented with plans for 
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 information dissemination, public transportation, temporary housing, and 
evacuation routes that will not be gridlocked death traps. 
On the other hand, restoring the wetlands also has many benefits besides 
hurricane protection, including preservation of the region’s ecology, the seafood 
industry, and the homes of coastal residents. Taking steps to retard global 
warming—one cause of coastal erosion—also carries many well-known benefits, 
not least of which is reduction of future potentially powerful storms. Yet the most 
important argument in favor of upgrading New Orleans’ levees to protect against 
a future Category 5 storm is that the city’s survival depends on the restoration of 
its residents’ confidence in our safety. In fact, warmer oceans and a period of 
more frequent hurricane activity suggests that New Orleans may well be hit by 
another major hurricane—including perhaps a Category 4 or 5—in the near 
future. And more importantly, traumatized residents and business owners will 
inevitably over-estimate this risk, and pin their return on the government’s 
willingness to err on the side of caution. This is why, in the wake of the once-
every-500 year Dutch flood of 1953, that country responded by building a flood 
protection system designed for floods on a once-every-10,000 year scale. 
Environmental Safety. The environmental impact of the post-Katrina flooding 
is still uncertain. How many toxic chemicals and germs were spread by the flood 
waters? Despite numerous tests of the soil, water, and air in and around New 
Orleans, there are conflicting reports about the types and amounts of toxins that 
are present and the amounts that are potentially harmful. Only the area near the 
Murphy Oil spill in that part of St. Bernard Parish, to the east of New Orleans, is 
clearly toxic by all accounts. Further information needs to be clarified and 
disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality. These agencies should also establish 
ongoing efforts to measure and report on soil, air, and water quality. Emphasis 
should be placed on environmentally friendly construction, mass transit, bike and 
walking paths, and shared access to community resources, in order to enhance the 
city’s long-term environmental safety. 
Public Education. Public K-12 education in New Orleans was already a 
catastrophe before Katrina. There has never been a better time to shake up the 
status quo. Most schools in the Orleans Parish system expect to remain closed for 
the remainder of the academic year due to a lack of funds as well as physical 
damage to facilities. Some of the city’s few successful schools are defecting to 
become charter schools. Congress should earmark necessary funds to reopen 
successful Orleans Parish schools immediately, and New Orleans should become 
a laboratory for well-funded and innovative public schools. At the risk of 
sounding self-interested, we contend that the city’s universities also need and 
deserve public financial support to remain viable through the uncertainties of the 
near future. 
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 Fighting Poverty. Images of poverty in New Orleans have been an eye-opener 
to much of middle-class America in the wake of Katrina. The U.S. government 
has slashed social services and gutted federal disaster agencies; inequality has 
increased in a country that already had the highest level of poverty and inequality 
in the industrialized West. And New Orleans has one of the highest poverty rates, 
and lowest car-ownership rates, in the country. The predictable results: an 
economically depressed state and city lacked the resources to respond effectively 
to a major emergency; most well-off and white people escaped; many poor and 
black people were left behind. As one African-American federal agency 
employee, working in New Orleans after the storm, put it, “If it was white soccer 
moms, they would have picked them up… Maybe people will wake up.” 
This, then, is our post-Katrina wish list for New Orleans. What is actually 
being done? As local and state officials struggle to craft a unified and 
comprehensive plan, partisans in Congress have split in predictable ways. 
Republicans envision their president’s “Gulf Opportunity Zone” as a vehicle for 
still more tax cuts for the wealthy, as well as for school vouchers and other forms 
of privatization. Democrats push for New Deal-type government investment in 
jobs and reconstruction projects. All are laboring under the burden of Bush-era 
record budget deficits. 
Restoring New Orleans is costly. Some powerful figures have suggested that 
the cost is prohibitive: House Speaker Dennis Hastert wondered shortly after the 
storm whether much of the city “could be bulldozed”; Senator Ted Stevens asked 
a New Orleans couple who lost their home why they would want to rebuild in 
such a place. Is it really worth it, rebuilding a poverty-stricken vulnerable city 
lying largely below sea level? 
The risks of rebuilding New Orleans are glaringly obvious, and make it easy 
to make a case against doing so. Yet how can the greatest country in the world fail 
its citizens so miserably? The city of New Orleans has existed in its present 
location for 287 years. And the United States government has accepted 
responsibility—has promised—to protect New Orleans against predictable 
weather events like Hurricane Katrina since 1890. Our city and our homes were 
destroyed not because Katrina was “the big one,” but because the federal Army 
Corps of Engineers failed to build the levees they were mandated by law to 
provide. Will our government let us down again? Will other cities be abandoned, 
rather than rebuilt, when they are struck by future storms, earthquakes, and terror 
attacks—attacks which the 9/11 Commission continues to describe as inevitable?  
Protecting its citizens is government’s first and most fundamental task. The 
United States failed to protect the residents of New Orleans against a predictable 
disaster, and we as a nation share a responsibility to restore that city, not stand by 
and watch its gradual demise. We believe this basic responsibility should be a 
given for any disaster approaching this scale. 
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 Yet if we are really to pick and choose which cities we save, will we really 
abandon New Orleans, one of the world’s truly unique cities and arguably 
America’s greatest cultural treasure? We have already mentioned the economic 
value of New Orleans to the rest of the nation: the port activity and the 
shipbuilding indelibly linked to the city’s location at the mouth of the Mississippi; 
the capital investments of the petrochemical industries; the tourism; the music. 
But to really understand the value of New Orleans, come with us as we take a 
tour of the city. Gaze at the exceptional mélange of architectural wonders, from 
the wrought-iron balconies of the French Quarter to the magnificent antebellum 
mansions and Creole cottages and funky shotgun houses. Dine on the country’s 
most original and divine cuisine, and then wake up to steaming café au lait and 
beignets. Visit the places where jazz was invented, where Louis Armstrong blew 
into his first trumpet, where countless musical genres from blues to funk to Cajun 
and zydeco and more have been conceived, honed, and expanded, and then 
choose from several spots where you can groove to that same music, every night 
of the year. Follow a second-line: scores of people dancing and jumping through 
the streets behind a lively brass band. Join the Halloween parade of New 
Orleanians costumed as stinky refrigerators or as houses with blue tarps on their 
heads and water lines across their foreheads. Stroll among the Spanish moss-
draped trees in Audubon Park. Marvel at the exceptional diversity in the nation’s 
only truly integrated city since long before the Civil War. 
Feel the warmth of the smiles and hugs of the many people—friends, 
neighbors, total strangers—who approach you every single day with that 
ubiquitous question: “How’d you make out?” You’ll see the pain in the eyes of 
those who are not coming back to live—not yet anyway; the money isn’t there, 
they have no place to go. You’ll see the joy in the eyes of those who are staying, 
determined to return and rebuild, because there is no place on earth even remotely 
like New Orleans. And we think you’ll agree: Yes, it’s worth it. 
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